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Abstract
Austin Bradford Hill's landmark 1965 paper contains several important lessons for the current
conduct of epidemiology. Unfortunately, it is almost exclusively cited as the source of the
"Bradford-Hill criteria" for inferring causation when association is observed, despite Hill's explicit
statement that cause-effect decisions cannot be based on a set of rules. Overlooked are Hill's
important lessons about how to make decisions based on epidemiologic evidence. He advised
epidemiologists to avoid over-emphasizing statistical significance testing, given the observation that
systematic error is often greater than random error. His compelling and intuitive examples point
out the need to consider costs and benefits when making decisions about health-promoting
interventions. These lessons, which offer ways to dramatically increase the contribution of health
science to decision making, are as needed today as they were when Hill presented them.
Introduction
One of the most cited papers in health research is Austin
Bradford Hill's "The Environment and Disease: Associa-
tion or Causation?" [1], Hill's 1965 Presidential Address
to the Section of Occupational Medicine of the Royal Soci-
ety of Medicine, where he presented what are now com-
monly called the "Bradford-Hill criteria." This paper
ironically gains its fame for providing a checklist for infer-
ring causation, something Hill did not claim to be creat-
ing. Meanwhile, largely ignored are its great insights and
potential contributions to critical methodological and
policy issues.
Hill outlined a systematic approach for using scientific
judgment to infer causation from statistical associations
observed in epidemiologic data, listing nine issues to be
considered when judging whether an observed associa-
tion is a causal relationship. Despite widely distributed
and clearly elaborated advice to the contrary [2], Hill's
nine considerations are still frequently taught to students
of epidemiology and referred to in the literature as "causal
criteria." Typically presented as a checklist approach to
assessing causation (though without a method for decid-
ing whether to assign a particular checkmark, let alone
how to make a final assessment), Hill's list is commonly
taught in epidemiology courses and is probably invoked
more often than any other method for assessing causa-
tion. At a time when the discussion of the nature of causa-
tion and methods for identifying causal effects are
reaching new levels of sophistication in epidemiology [3-
5], this is particularly unfortunate.
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Hill never used the term "criteria" and he explicitly stated
that he did not believe any hard-and-fast rules of evidence
could be laid down, emphasizing that his nine "view-
points" [1](p. 299) were neither necessary nor sufficient
for causation. His suggestions about how to intuitively
assess causation are almost completely lost when his
address is distilled into a checklist (See endnote 1).
Causal criteria are an intriguing subject for the history of
science, including the question of why Hill's list seems
more popular than others [7-10] and whether causal con-
clusions that explicitly appealed to criteria are more likely
to be borne out by subsequent evidence. (To our knowl-
edge, there has been no such validation study of causal cri-
teria.) But it is not the main purpose of this analysis to
join the extensive discussion of the history and merits of
causal criteria. We will say only that Hill's list seems to
have been a useful contribution to a young science that
surely needed systematic thinking, but it long since
should have been relegated to part of the historical foun-
dation, as an early rough cut. Yet it is still being recited by
many as something like natural law. Appealing in our
teaching and epistemology to the untested "criteria" of a
great luminary from the past is reminiscent of the "scien-
tific" methods of the Dark Ages. Hill's own caveats suggest
a similar opinion (though such a claim requires some cau-
tion, given that Hill repeated his list in his medical statis-
tics textbooks until the time of his death, adding neither
an evolution in his perspective nor arguments to support
the validity or usefulness of the list [11-14]).
This brief analysis of Hill's "criteria" and what has been
made of them can add little new to that topic (though we
will argue that Hill deserves more credit than he is usually
given by critics of "criteria" for the nuances and examples
he presented). Our purpose is to call attention to the sel-
dom-cited last page and a half of the article, which
presents lessons that remain overlooked today.
Analysis
Hill eloquently warned about overemphasis on statistical
significance testing, writing "the glitter of the t  table
diverts attention from the inadequacies of the fare" [1](p.
299). The mistake of drawing conclusions from inade-
quate samples had been replaced with the mistake of
treating statistical significance as necessary and sufficient
for action. An intellectual generation passed after 1965
with almost no improvement [15], and little has changed
in another generation after that. Researchers still fre-
quently present results as if statistical significance and p-
values are useful decision criteria, and decision makers are
left with inadequate information.
One implication of Hill's advice is well understood.
Emphasis on the p-value (let alone dichotomous state-
ments of significance) has been soundly denounced for
decades [16,17]. Estimation of effect sizes, presented as
point estimates with confidence intervals, is the preferred
method in current textbooks [18] and these are generally
reported, though in practice confidence intervals tend to
be interpreted as mere tests of statistical significance by
ignoring their range except to note whether or not they
include the null value (see endnote 2).
A further inadequacy of the fare is less well appreciated,
stemming not from the question of p-values versus confi-
dence intervals, but from systematic errors. No statistical
test of random sampling error informs us about the possi-
ble impacts of measurement error, confounding, and
selection bias. Methods for quantifying such errors (and
perhaps more importantly, arguments for why we need to
do so) have been developed in epidemiology, particularly
over the last five years [19-25]. Hill hinted at this more
than three decades before the recent spate of attention
when he noted that one of his own studies [26], like many
studies, had great potential for selection bias (though he
does not use this term). In effect, he asks "why would I
bother to do an exaggeratedly precise statistical test when
I know that the other sources of error are likely so large?"
Rather than emphasize low p-values, he concluded that
simple cell counts made both random error and plausible
systematic error unlikely to account for the observed asso-
ciation. While his solution was inadequate – indeed, it
might even be called hubris (see endnote 3) – he did issue
a clear warning about mistaking statistical precision for
validity. Despite the influence of Hill's article, the fact that
it contained this point is forgotten (and the point, while
obviously true, remains widely ignored).
Even as modern epidemiologic analysts become less daz-
zled by the t-table, replacing significance testing with con-
fidence intervals and introducing quantification of
systematic errors, there is still a tendency to completely
overlook Hill's other important insight. Hill sought to
address the question how to decide whether to take action
once causal inferences are made. In his last few para-
graphs, he offers an important commentary on the policy
recommendations that flow from decisions regarding
cause and effect in epidemiology. Since "our object is usu-
ally to take action" [1](p. 300), policy considerations are
central to the importance of the science. While epidemiol-
ogy has its roots in specific policy questions ("can we do
something to prevent cholera outbreaks?"), epidemiolo-
gists have ambivalent attitudes towards the policy deci-
sions associated with their research [31]. In grant
applications and introductions to research reports, it is
typical for epidemiologists to justify expensive research
based on immediate practical benefits. But in presenting
the results, they often deny, implicitly or explicitly, the
need to assess the policy contributions [32], defending theEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2004, 1:3 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/1/1/3
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value of science for its own sake (sometimes even as they
issue press releases calling for policy responses).
Even when policy implications are presented explicitly,
they are seldom carefully analyzed. Analyzing the implica-
tions of a health research finding for decision making is
often not terribly difficult, but making recommendations
without such analysis can lead to absurd suggestions [33].
One epidemiology journal famously goes so far as to
instruct authors to avoid the common practice of tacking
on policy recommendations at the end of research reports.
The argument is that policy analysis is too complicated
and too serious to be an afterthought by researchers
whose expertise lies elsewhere [34,35]. Judging from Hill's
comments, he might have preferred more careful policy
analysis be included in epidemiologic research reports,
rather than none at all, though it is not clear he could
solve the challenge of fitting it into the standard 3000-
word, single-result health research paper. The present
journal offers a solution by publishing policy analyses
that are based on health research results, and allowing the
articles to be whatever length they need be [36].
Hill, who was educated in economics, argued that in order
to take policy action, we ought to pay attention to the
absolute costs and benefits of potential actions. It would
clearly be reading too much into the text to suggest that he
had a prescient vision of modern probability-weighted
cost and benefit based policy analyses and decision theory
(those fields were in their early stages at the time of his
writing and he never used any of those terms). But, in
another memorable phrase, he did make the case for hav-
ing "differential standards before we convict" [1](p. 300),
based on costs and benefits. Moving another step beyond
statistical significance testing, we need to consider more
than the degree of certainty that there is some health haz-
ard, and act based on the expected gains and losses, with
or without statistical certainty. 
Hill points this out (in an example sufficiently ill-chosen
that it may have contributed to his important message
being ignored): "On relatively slight evidence we might
decide to restrict the use of a drug for early-morning sick-
ness in pregnant women. If we are wrong in deducing cau-
sation from association no great harm will be done. The
good lady and the pharmaceutical industry will doubtless
survive [1](p. 300)."
Setting aside the impolitic dismissal of women's prefer-
ences and the unsupported assertion that there is no great
harm at stake (as well as the irony of the popularity, with-
drawl, and rehabilitation of the morning sickness drug,
Bendectin) the underlying point might be his most
important lesson: Policy actions that appear to create a net
benefit (on average, considering all costs and benefits)
should be taken, even without statistical "proof" of an
association, while actions that entail great costs should
only be taken with sufficient certainty of substantial ben-
efit.
Hill goes on to strengthen his argument: "On fair evidence
we might take action on what appears to be an occupa-
tional hazard, e.g. we might change from a probably car-
cinogenic oil to a noncarcinogenic oil in a limited
environment and without too much injustice if we are
wrong. But we should need very strong evidence before we
made people burn a fuel in their homes that they do not
like or stop smoking the cigarettes and eating the fats and
sugar that they do like [1](p.300)."
Hill clearly stated that the science and data analysis
should not be influenced by what is at stake. But health
researchers should recognize that the stakes matter, and
incorporate a consideration of them into their work. The
alternative to carrying out the policy analysis is to leave
the weighing of costs and benefits to an unreliable post-
science political process.
The observation that the costs and benefits matter, despite
being rather obvious, is frequently – indeed, typically –
overlooked in public health discussions. The popular
decongestant phenylpropanolamine was banned on weak
evidence without regard to the high cost to consumers
[37]; dietary recommendations are made without consid-
ering absolute benefits, let alone the cost to people of
avoiding their favorite foods; and health and safety regu-
lations are tremendously uneven in their cost effective-
ness, to cite just three examples. The "policy
recommendations" paragraph found in many health
research papers sometimes quantifies medical costs, but
typically ignores lifestyle, psychological, or productivity
costs. It is even rare to find quantification of the absolute
aggregate benefit that would result from a policy or behav-
ioral change.
Making a good decision does not depend on having stud-
ies with confidence intervals that exclude the null. A best
decision can be based on whatever information we have
now, and indeed a decision will be made – after all, the
decision to maintain the status quo is still a decision
[20,38]. Hill offered his clearest condemnation of over-
emphasizing statistical significance testing, not when he
discussed p-values, but when he concluded by saying: "All
scientific work is incomplete – whether it be observational
or experimental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or
modified by advancing knowledge. That does not confer
upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge we already
have, or to postpone the action that it appears to demand
at a given time [1](p. 300)."Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2004, 1:3 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/1/1/3
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The pursuit of the low p-value (or confidence interval that
excludes the null) leaves our society postponing appar-
ently useful policy choices while we do more research to
try to show what we already believe to be true. It also cre-
ates the incentive to use dubious methods (e.g., unstated
multiple hypothesis testing, choosing models or trans-
forming data to maximize the effect size [39]) in order to
squeeze out significant results. Those same methods can
be used by those who would prefer to make real causal
relationships disappear below the p = .05 horizon. Mak-
ing the best of the knowledge we have would reduce such
temptations. If epidemiologists help empower policy
makers to ban an easily-replaced chemical when we
believe there is, say, a 50-50 chance that it is a health haz-
ard (based on an honest assessment of all uncertainty),
then the payoff for fiddling with the data to show the cer-
tainty is a bit higher or a bit lower would be eliminated.
This would release us from the trap of letting ignorance
trump knowledge. Regulators often fail to act because we
have not yet statistically "proven" an association between
an exposure and a disease, even when there is enough evi-
dence to strongly suspect a causal relationship. There is a
growing movement to escape this mistake by making a
similar mistake in the other direction: adopting precau-
tionary principles, which typically call for restrictions
until we have "proven" lack of causal association – a deci-
sion based on ignorance that merely reverses the default.
If we can escape from the false dichotomy of "proven vs.
not proven," facilitated by the nonexistant bright line
implied by statistical hypothesis testing and by the notion
that causality can be definitively inferred from a list of cri-
teria, then we can make decisions based on what we do
know rather than what we don't.
Conclusions
The uncritical repetition of Hill's "causal criteria" is prob-
ably counterproductive in promoting sophisticated
understanding of causal inference. But a different list of
considerations that can be found in his address is worthy
of repeating:
• Statistical significance should not be mistaken for evi-
dence of a substantial association.
• Association does not prove causation (other evidence
must be considered).
• Precision should not be mistaken for validity (non-ran-
dom errors exist).
• Evidence (or belief) that there is a causal relationship is
not sufficient to suggest action should be taken.
• Uncertainty about whether there is a causal relationship
(or even an association) is not sufficient to suggest action
should not be taken.
These points may seem obvious when stated so bluntly,
but causal inference and health policy decision making
would benefit tremendously if they were considered more
carefully and more often. The last point may be the most
important unlearned lesson in health decision making.
In fairness to those who do not appreciate these points
even today, it overinterprets Hill's short paper to claim
that he clearly laid out these considerations, or that he was
calling for modern decision analysis and uncertainty
quantification. But the fundamental concepts were clearly
there (and the overinterpretation is not as great as that
required to derive a checklist of criteria for determining
causation). Several generations of advancement in epide-
miology and policy analysis provide much deeper exposi-
tion of his points. But Hill still offers timeless insightful
analysis about how to interpret our observations.
Strangely, these forgotten lessons, which are only slowly
and grudgingly being appreciated in modern epidemiol-
ogy, are hidden in plain sight, in what is possibly the best
known paper in the field.
Endnotes
1. Interestingly, there are more extreme cases of a scholar's
name being immortalized for something contrary to his
beliefs. The "Coase Theorem" in economics, from one of
the most cited article in the economics and legal litera-
tures [6] (often identified as the most cited article in one
of those fields or in their intersection), is usually invoked
to make worldly claims that certain beneficial transactions
will occur (which, among other things, reduce the need
for regulation). But much of Coase's work (including that
paper) focuses on how the circumstances required for
those transactions to take place are absent in the real
world.
2. Reporting confidence intervals provides more informa-
tion about the estimated association of an exposure and
outcome. For example, a large measured effect with a wide
confidence interval and a small measured effect with a
narrow confidence interval may have the same p-value,
but the confidence intervals suggests that a large associa-
tion is likely in the former case, but not the latter. This has
implications for both scientific conclusions and decision
making. However, the reporting of confidence intervals
addresses only this limitation, not others described subse-
quently.
3. In effect, Hill claimed that the association was so strong
that neither the random nor the systematic error could
explain it. In doing so, he failed to heed his own observa-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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tion that systematic errors might explain an association
no matter how low the p-value, and invoked the strength
of the statistical association to rule out the possibility it
was caused by systematic error. More important, Hill
made the mistake of overestimating his ability to intui-
tively assess complicated quantitative relationships. In
Hill's defense, his remark predated the research, primarily
from the 1970s and 1980s, that demonstrated that both
lay people and experts have poor quantitative intuition
(most of the key papers from that literature can be found
in a few collected volumes [27-30]). Current researchers
who argue that their intuition obviates the need for mod-
ern methods for quantifying uncertainty have no such
excuse.
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